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THE RIGHT TO INSPECT PUBLIC RECORDS
IN OHIO
GARY ELSON BROWN*
This article will analyze the general right of the public to exam-
ine the various records, data, and documents maintained by public
officials in the files of the many governmental entities throughout
Ohio. This right obtains from a distinct body of law which should not
be confused with the various discovery rights of parties in litigation
or any other right of access gained through compulsory legal process.
For the most part, the analysis will be limited to the general right to
inspect public records established by § 149.43 of the Revised Code,
though it will include a brief review of the early common law on the
subject in order to aid understanding of the current legal framework.
An effort will be made to cite specific examples of both public and
nonpublic records. There are both technical and policy arguments
supporting the proposition that most, but not all, governmental re-
cords should be available for public inspection. In this regard, the
interests of the inquiring public, the limited need for governmental
confidentiality, and the right to privacy of the person who is the
subject of governmental record-keeping will be explored. Another
section of the article will be specifically devoted to the effect of the
recently enacted statutory right to individual privacy on the right to
inspect public records. Finally, this article will outline the various
remedies available for enforcement of the right of inspection.
I. THE COMMON-LAW DEVELOPMENT
Courts in both England' and the United States2 have recognized
a common-law right to inspect public records. In England there was
some dispute whether there was a broad general right of inspection
or whether this right was limited to those who possessed a special or
direct private interest to be served by inspection, as well as whether
inspection was limited to those records or parts of records that af-
* Assistant Attorney General, State of Ohio, Administrative Agencies Section.
24 AM. & ENG. ENCY. OF LAW REcoRDs 182 (2d ed. 1903); People ex rel. Henry v.
Cornell, 47 Barb. 329 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1866).
1 State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900): Boylan v. Warren, 39
Kan. 301, 18 P. 174 (1888); Brown v. Knapp, 54 Mich. 132, 19 N.W. 778 (1884): Burton v.
Tuite, 78 Mich. 363, 44 N.W. 282 (1889); State ex rel. Thomas v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 620
(1885): In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, 29 A. 259 (1893): State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L.
332 (1879); State ex rel. Wellford v. Williams, 110 Tenn. 549, 75 S.W. 948 (1903): Gleaves v.
Terry, 93 Va. 491, 25 S.E. 552 (1896).
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fected that interest.3 Much of the confusion reflected in the incon-
gruous holdings in the English cases was probably due to the unusual
enforcement procedures available and the limited right of the public
to seek redress of an alleged wrong rather than the substantive nature
of the right involved.'
In America, most of the early cases that contained discussions
of the common law either concluded that the general rule in England
did not require a special or direct private interest5 or rejected this
restrictive requirement as not necessarily binding upon the courts of
this country.6 In these cases the controversy generally concerned the
issue of which persons possessed the right to inspect a public record
rather than whether a particular document was in fact a public record
and thereby subject to inspection.7
In the early American cases the courts premised the general right
to inspect public records upon various concepts such as citizenship,
municipal corporation theories, and "public trust" concepts. Courts
that based the right upon citizenship held that the mere status of
citizenship or residency within a political entity vested in the person
seeking inspection a right to examine public records of that entity.'
Other courts buttressed this rationale by pointing to the absence of
any statutory prohibition of public inspection.9 Arguments seeking to
create a distinction between the status of a mere citizen and that of
a taxpayer appear to have fallen on deaf ears.10 The municipal corpo-
ration theory was quite similar to the citizenship theory, embodying
the idea that an individual has a right to inspect public records merely
because he is a member of the municipal corporation." Finally,
courts relying upon the concept of a "public trust" theorized that a
public official is elected or appointed to act on behalf of the people
he or she serves and merely holds public records in trust for the public
who, as beneficiaries of this trust, may inspect this property in the
3 See Stewart, The Right to Examine Public Records, 37 CENT. L.J. 395 (1893).
For a brief discussion of this see Wells v. Lewis, 12 Ohio Dec. 170, 175 (Super. Ct. 190 1).
citing State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332 (1879).
E.g., People ex rel. Henry v. Cornell, 47 Barb. 329 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1866).
£ E.g., State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332 (1879).
See generally Wells v. Lewis, 12 Ohio Dec. 170 (Super. Ct. 1901).
E.g., State ex rel. Thomas v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 620 (1885); Gleaves v. Terry, 93 Va.
491, 25 S.E. 552 (1896).
Burton v. Tuite, 78 Mich. 363, 44 N.W. 282 (1889); Wells v. Lewis. 12 Ohio Dec. 170
(Super. Ct. 1901).
"0 See, e.g., Wells v. Lewis, 12 Ohio Dec. 170, 176 (Super. Ct. 1901), citing Ruffner v.
Commissioners, 12 Ohio Dec. Reprint 571 (Super. Ct. 1856).
" See, e.g., People ex rel. Henry v. Cornell, 47 Barb. 329 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1866): Wells v.
Lewis, 12 Ohio Dec. 170 (Super. Ct. 1901).
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absence of an overriding governmental interest against inspection. 2
In Ohio, the common-law right to inspect public records has
been recognized since the earliest reported cases. 3 In the absence of
a statutory provision to the contrary, this common-law right has been
subject only to the conditions that any inspection must not endanger
the safety of the record or unreasonably interfere with the discharge
of the duties of the public official having custody of the records. 4
Public records have been available for inspection by anyone regard-
less of whether or not they had some special or direct private interest
in their contents. 5 The right to make copies of public records appears
to have always been a corollary to the right to inspect."
The great preponderance of early Ohio cases, like those of other
jurisdictions, primarily examined the nature of the right of inspection
and the issue of which persons were entitled to this right rather than
whether a particular document was in fact a public record. In recent
years, the focus of debate has shifted dramatically to the issue of
whether a particular record or document is a public record." This
area of volatile controversy is an offspring of the Ohio public records
statute, which was enacted to codify and clarify the longstanding
common-law right to inspect public records in this state. Although
this article will attempt in part to examine the need for further judi-
cial or legislative clarification of the right to inspect public records,
it is not intended to be critical of the basic purpose of legislative steps
already taken in this area.
II. THE OHIO STATUTE
In Ohio, as in many other states," the General Assembly has
n See Krickenberger v. Wilson, 3 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 179 (C.P. Darke Cty. 1905). See also,
State ex rel. Patterson v. Ayers, 171 Ohio St. 369, 371, 171 N.E.2d 508, 509 (1960).
" See, e.g., Wells v. Lewis, 12 Ohio Dec. 170 (Sup. Ct. 1901); Krickenberger v. Wilson,
3 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 179 (C.P. Darke Cty. 1905); State ex rel. Withworth Bros. Co. v. Dittey, 12
Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 319 (C.P. Franklin Cty. 1911); State ex rel. Sullivan v. Wilson, 24 Ohio L.
Abs. 208 (C.P. Hamilton Cty. 1937).
" See Krickenberger v. Wilson, 3 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 179 (C.P. Darke Cty. 1905); Wells v.
Lewis, 12 Ohio Dec. 170 (Super. Ct. 1901).
'5 State ex rel. Louisville Title Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 147 Ohio St. 161, 70 N.E.2d 265 (1946).
" See State ex reL Sullivan v. Wilson, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 208 (C.P. Hamilton Cty. 1937).
' See, e.g., Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 45 Ohio St. 2d 107, 341 N.E.2d
576 (1976); State ex rel. Patterson v. Ayers, 171 Ohio St. 369, 371, 171 N.E.2d 508 (1960).
18 Forty-four states have statutes granting access to public records. ALA. CODE tit. 41, §
145 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.110 (1973); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-121 (1974); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2804 (1968); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6253 (West Supp. 1976); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 24-72-203 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-19 (Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
119.01 (Supp. 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-2701; HAWAit REV. STAT. § 92-51 (Supp. 1975):
I)AIIO CODE § 9-301 (1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 116, § 43.103a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976):
IND. ANN. STAT. § 5-14-1-3 (Burns 1974); IOWA Coo ANN. § 68A.2 (1973); KAN. STAT. ANN.
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codified the right to inspect and copy public records. Section 149.43
of the Revised Code, enacted in 1963, defines a "public record" and
regulates the availability of such records in the following terms:
As used in this section, "public record" means any record re-
quired to be kept by any governmental unit, including, but not
limited to, state, county, city, village, township, and school district
units, except records pertaining to physical or psychiatric examina-
tions, adoption, probation, and parole proceedings, and records the
release of which is prohibited by state or federal law.
All public records shall be open at all reasonable times for
inspection. Upon request, a person responsible for public records
shall make copies available at cost, within a reasonable period of
time. 9
Two years later the General Assembly enacted a series of stat-
utes designed to clarify the status of the Ohio Historical Society and
to provide additional guidelines regarding the availability of "public
records" stored in a records center or archival institution. 0 As part
of this legislation, the General Assembly further refined the definition
of "public records" by defining a "record" in section 149.40:
Any document, device, or item, regardless of physical form or
characteristic, created or received by or coming under the jurisdic-
tion of any public office of the state or its political subdivisions
which serves to document the organization, functions, policies, deci-
sions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the office, is a
record within the meaning of sections 149.31 to 149.44, inclusive,
of the Revised Code .... 21
In light of these statutory enactments, it is clear that the general
right to inspect "public records" in Ohio applies to all three branches
§ 45-201 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.650 (1973) LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.31 (1951);
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 1, § 405 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § 2 (1975), MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 66, § 10 (Supp. 1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.492 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 15.17(4) (Supp. 1976); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 109.180 (Vernon 1966); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 59-512 (1970); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-712 (1971); NEV. REV. STAT. § 239.010 (1975); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A: 4 (Cum. Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:IA-2 (Supp. 1976): N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 71-5-1 (Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-6 (1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-
04-18 (1960); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Page 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 24
(1962); ORE. REV. STAT. § 192.030 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.2 (1959); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-20.2 (Cum. Supp. 1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 1-27-1 (1974); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 15-304 (1973); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a(3) (Supp. 1975); UTAH CODnE
ANN. § 78-26-2 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-342 (Cum. Supp. 1976); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 39.04.100 (1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.21(2) (1972); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 9-692.2 (Cum. Supp.
1975).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Page 1969).
Id. § 149.31-.99.
21 Id. § 149.40.
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of government" and to governmental entities at all levels. Although
there may be ample room for dispute concerning whether a particular
record is public and thereby subject to inspection, in the absence of
a specific statutory exclusion 3 there can be little dispute about
whether the particular governmental entity involved is subject to the
coverage of the act. Whether a particular item is a "record" is also
easily resolved, since the General Assembly has defined a "record"
very broadly, including "[a]ny document, device or item, regardless
of physical form or characteristic. . . which serves to document...
activities of the office .
Section 149.40 defines a "record" and is not designed to assist
in deciding whether a particular record is in fact a "public record.",
Therefore, in examining the issue of what constitutes a public record
one must be careful to limit the analysis to § 149.43, and thus not
extend the right of inspection to all "records" as defined in § 149.40.
With certain enumerated exceptions, the General Assembly
chose to define a public record merely as "any record required to be
kept by any governmental unit." The ambiguous language of this
enactment did little to clarify the extent of the common-law right.
This definition of a "public record" presents two primary questions.
First, what does the word "kept" mean in this context? Second, how
does one determine which records are "required" to be kept by a
particular governmental unit? Thus quite a dilemma is posed for all
public officials who stand between the inquiring public and a record
which is neither clearly public nor clearly confidential.
It is difficult to determine what law or rule the General Assem-
bly envisioned as the proper referent of the phrase "required to be
kept." The only general statutory provision regarding the making and
preservation of records in existence at the time of this enactment
applied to departments of state and merely provided that each depart-
ment was required to keep such "records and journals as may be
necessary to exhibit its official actions and proceedings. ' 21 Of course,
the Revised Code contained a plethora of specific statutory instances
1 These are the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Perhaps mention should be
made here of the "fourth branch," the multitude of administrative agencies, boards, bureaus,
commissions, etc., which are also included in the broad sweep of the term "any governmental
unit" used in § 149.43.
23 See, e.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 109.57 (Page Supp. 1975), which specifically ex-
cludes many records required to be kept by the Bureau of Criminal Investigation.
21 There has been some analytical confusion in this respect. See note 33 infra and accompa-
nying text.
I OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (Page 1969).
Is Section 154-18, General Code, which provided in part: "Each department shall provide
for the keeping, within such department, of such records and journals as may be necessary to
exhibit its official actions and proceedings." Act of April 26, 1921, 109 Ohio Laws 109.
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of "records" which were required to be kept by various governmental
units? But any comprehensive determination of the proper extent of
the statutory right to inspect public records had to await judicial
interpretation of the statute.
It should also be noted here that the statutory scheme in Ohio
is considerably different than that employed in the Federal Freedom
of Information Act.2s The Federal Act is more comprehensive and
provides that, subject to nine categorical exemptions, 2 identifiable
records of governmental agencies shall be made available to any
person upon request."0 In contrast, the Ohio law is very brief and
certainly more ambiguous. Because of the important differences in
statutory schemes, it would be imprudent to rely upon federal case
law in attempting to argue other than policy considerations in dis-
putes concerning alleged public records in Ohio.
III. RECENT OHIO CASE LAW
The first reported case construing the Ohio public records stat-
ute was Curran v. Board of Park Commissioners."' This court of
common pleas decision shed considerable light upon the phrase "re-
quired to be kept" by holding that "public records are those records
which a governmental unit is required by law to keep or which it is
necessary to keep in discharge of duties imposed by law. '3 2 Although
this limited holding would have been a logical and practical solution
to the issue at hand, the court continued its analysis and in the process
created a certain amount of unnecessary confusion. The first confus-
ing aspect of this opinion was the court's extension of the statutory
right of inspection to all records, as defined in § 149.40, and not only
those defined as public in § 149.43 of the Revised Code.33 The other
confusing aspect of this case was the creation of the distinction that
documents originating outside of the governmental unit involved are
not public records. 4 This established an unfortunate precedent,3 5
21 See. e.g., OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4715.08 (Page 1954) (certain Dental Board records);
OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3701.04, 3701.09, 3701.15 (Page 197 1) (certain Department of Health
records); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1545.08 (Page Supp. 1975) (Park Board records); Olio
REV. CODE ANN. § 109.22 (Page 1969) (records in the Attorney General's Office).
- 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
" Id. § 552 (b)(l)-(9).
10 Id. § 552(a).
11 22 Ohio Misc. 197, 259 N.E.2d 757 (C.P. Lake Cty. 1970). The plaintiff in this case
was seeking to compel the defendant Board to open up all of its records for public inspection.
especially the appraisals contained in the defendant's land acquisition files. The court denied
inspection, holding that these materials were not public records as defined in § 149.43.
2 Id. at 199, 259 N.E.2d at 759 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
3 Id.
' Id. at 199, 259 N.E.2d at 760.
See 71 OHio A'rr'y GEN. Op., No. 053 (1971), which cites this passage with approval.
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since the issue of whether the land appraisals at issue in Curran are
public records should not depend upon their origin. Assuming the
result in this case was proper, it would have been more analytically
sound to conclude that these records were not "required to be kept"
by the Park Board and were for this reason not subject to inspection.
However, this aspect of the reasoning contained in this opinion has
never been reviewed or rejected by an appellate court.
The first case in which the Ohio Supreme Court discussed the
definition of a public record was State ex rel. Grosser v. Boy. 6 In
this case, the appellants were seeking to obtain a list of the names
and addresses of all students in a particular high school and also a
list of those students taking a course called "Street Literature". In
its per curiam opinion, the court reversed the court of appeals and
held that the records in question were clearly required by statute to
be maintained and were therefore open to public inspection. Because
of the clear-cut statutory record keeping requirements pertaining to
the information sought, the court was not required to engage in any
novel or substantial analysis of § 149.43. The court merely equated
"kept" with "maintained" and held that, since the records in question
were required by statute to be kept,37 they were public records under
the "required to be kept" provision of § 149.43.11
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the Grosser opinion was
the rather curt reference to an envisioned "competing right to individ-
ual privacy."39 It is probable that this important issue will arise in a
future dispute over public records, since the General Assembly has
recently enacted privacy legislation" which will be relevant to
whether certain records should be disclosed pursuant to § 149.43. This
new legislation will be more fully discussed in a later section of this
article."
The most recent and clearly the most important Ohio Supreme
Court case concerning the issue of what constitutes a public record
was Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Dayton.2 Finally, thirteen
years after the passage of the public records statute, the court was
presented an excellent opportunity to clarify what constitutes a public
record when no specific statutory provision applies to the "record"
in controversy.
42 Ohio St. 2d 498, 330 N.E.2d 442 (1975).
" Ouio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3317.021, 3319.32, 3321.12 (Page 1972).
42 Ohio St. 2d 498, 500, 330 N.E.2d 442, 444 (1975).
3' "The instant case does not require us to weigh the effect of R.C. 149.43 upon any
breach of a competing right to individual privacy." Id. at 500 n.2, 330 N.E.2d at 444 n.2.
Om~o REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1347.01-.99 (Page Current Service 1976).
' See section V infra.
n 45 Ohio St. 2d 107, 341 N.E.2d 576 (1976).
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The debate in Dayton Newspapers concerned whether the daily
"jail register" or "log"43 maintained by the Dayton Police Depart-
ment was a public record open to inspection under § 149.43. Appellees
urged the Court to construe "required to be kept" to mean that the
record must be required by statute-or at least, by the official policy
of a unit of government-to be kept." In rejecting this argument,
Justice William B. Brown stated for the court that he would be more
readily inclined to adopt this construction if § 149.43 stated "required
by law to be kept."45 Justice Brown conceded that the phrase "re-
quired to be kept" is ambiguous and that the reason for its insertion
in the statute is not readily apparent;46 nonetheless the court accepted
the argument of appellants that a "record required to be kept" should
be construed to mean "any record which but for its keeping the
governmental unit could not carry out its duties and responsibilities;
that the raison d'etre of such record is to assure the proper function-
ing of the unit."4 7 In reversing the lower court decision, the court held,
as stated in its syllabus: "A record is 'required to be kept' by a
governmental unit, within the meaning of R.C. 149.43, where the
unit's keeping of such record is necessary to the unit's execution of
its duties and responsibilities."
The court also recognized in Dayton Newspapers the philosophi-
cal underpinnings of the right to inspect public records:
The rule in Ohio is that public records are the people's records,
and that the officials in whose custody they happen to be are merely
trustees for the people; therefore anyone may inspect such records
at any time, subject only to the limitation that such inspection does
not endanger the safety of the record, or unreasonably interfere with
the discharge of the duties of the officer having custody of the
same. 
4
The opinion appears to lend considerable guidance in resolving
the issue of what is and what is not a public record. Indeed, the court
even stated that it had adopted the extremely clear position that, since
"doubt should be resolved in favor of disclosure. . . ,records should
be available to the public unless the custodian of such records can
show a legal prohibition to disclosure."49 But this position is not
'" The following information was contained in the jail log: arrest number, name of pris-
oner, charge, date, time, and disposition. Id. at 107, 341 N.E.2d at 576.
11 Id. at 108, 341 N.E.2d at 577.
43 Id.
I' d.
Id. at 108-09, 341 N.E.2d at 577.
I d. at 109, 341 N.E.2d at 577-78 (citations omitted).
41 Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 578 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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stated in the syllabus, nor is it necessary to the result. Moreover, the
statutory provision that only those records "required to be kept" are
subject to disclosure would be read out of the statute under this
approach. Thus it is submitted that the true significance of this case
is its clarification of the statutory standard of what makes a record
public, as stated in the syllabus agreed to by the court, rather than
the dictum in the opinion that would lead one to ignore the statutory
limits contained in the definition of a "public record."
However, upon application of this standard, one very thorny
problem remains. Since the court has construed the phrase "required
to be kept" to mean that the governmental "unit's keeping of such
record is necessary to the unit's execution of its duties and responsi-
bilities," it has done nothing to clarify the significance of the word
"kept" in the statutory definition.
For several reasons, the term as used in this statute should be
construed to mean the maintenance of the record over time. First, a
"record" is normally distinguished from other writings in that it is
useful because of its maintenance and availability at all times. This
is the usefulness of the jail log in Dayton Newspapers, as opposed to
inter-office memoranda that are necessary to the agency's functions
in order to communicate information rather than to document facts
or activities for the future. Second, although the definition of a record
in § 149.40 does not use the word "maintenance," it does limit the
definition of a "record" to an item "which serves to document" the
activities of the governmental unit, and therefore does not embrace
items which merely communicate information; moreover it is reason-
able to conclude that the General Assembly intended to convey this
common meaning of the word "record" when it limited the statute's
effect only to records "required to be kept."
Finally, strong policy considerations weigh in favor of restricting
access to many everyday communications among governmental
employees and outsiders which are not intended to be formal records
for any future purpose. These considerations include both preserving
the ability of governmental employees to communicate freely-and
to propose hypothetical courses of action-as well as keeping govern-
mental employees from the burden of searching files for items that
are of little use to the public in understanding the agency's activities.
Thus the right to inspect public records, as interpreted in Dayton
Newspapers, should extend only to items which are necessary to the
agency because of their usefulness in documenting information for
future use.
This analysis of the "required to be kept" element of the statute
is consistent with the view of the Ohio Supreme Court in Dayton
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Newspapers. The jail log in question in that case was undoubtedly
required to be maintained in order for the police to adequately and
properly carry out their duty to operate the city jail. There would be
no reasonable or practical means of operating the city jail without
having a record of who was being detained, a means of identifying
the prisoners and the reason why each individual prisoner was being
detained, and a record of the date of each prisoner's entry and exit
from the facility. Finally, as noted by the concurring justices in
Dayton Newspapers,0 constitutional considerations prevent the po-
lice from incarcerating an American citizen while keeping such infor-
mation secret.
Thus there are two reasons why the jail log in question was and
should have been held to be a public record: the record was "required
to be kept" both by the needs of the agency and by the dictates of
the Constitution. However, even though either line of reasoning
would suffice to make a record public, statutory analysis should
prove to be dispositive of the issue in the great majority of situations.
With this in mind, an attempt will now be made to discuss specific
examples of both public and nonpublic governmental records.
IV. SCOPE OF THE STATUTE
A. Specific Examples of Public Records
In the operations of government at the state level, the vast ma-
jority of civil records in which the public would have an interest are
maintained by the various departments of state or numerous
administrative agencies which have been created by the General As-
sembly. Many people have an interest in the voluminous records
maintained by the judicial branch, but there is little question that
almost all of these records are open to inspection.
It would be helpful to categorize the various types of records
about which there is little question in regard to public inspection.
Taking the "ordinary" department of state or administrative agency,
board, or commission as an example, it appears that the following
types of records must be maintained for the agency to function and
are thus subject to disclosure: the identity of members of the board
or commission, the names and salaries of its staff, administrative
rules, departmental and agency bylaws, contracts to which the entity
is a party, the record of minutes of the proceedings of the entity, its
finance records, a register of licensees, and a register of applicants
for licenses. The list of records above is only intended to present
Id. at 110-12, 341 N.E.2d at 578-79 (Corrigan, J., concurring).
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examples of public records and should by no means be considered an
exhaustive listing.
B. Specific Examples of Items that are Not Public Records
In contrast, state departments and agencies may also possess
other documents or records that should not be considered public
records. A categorical listing of such types of records includes: cer-
tain inter-office and intra-office memoranda, attorney-client corre-
spondence, 5' investigative work product (other than inspection re-
ports required by statute to be kept), and letters of complaint, in-
cluding the identity of the complainant. In addition to the fact that
there are strong policy arguments supporting the contention that the
above enumerated types of records should not be available for inspec-
tion, it would seem legitimate to conclude that none of these types
of records are specifically required by statute to be kept; nor are they
of the nature that but for their keeping the public official involved
could not carry out his official duties. A comparison of the nature of
the particular types of records described above with the jail log at
issue in Dayton Newspapers leads this author to conclude that in the
absence of the keeping of the items listed above the departments or
agencies involved could fulfill their statutory obligations; thus they
are not public records as defined by the Ohio Supreme Court in
Dayton Newspapers.
Although the above discussion was directed primarily toward
state departments and agencies involved in civil law enforcement, it
should also apply to those public agencies involved in criminal law
enforcement. However, if the courts do discern a difference between
the nature of records maintained by officials charged with enforcing
civil laws and those records maintained by officials charged with
enforcing criminal laws, it would appear that civil records would be
more likely to be held subject to public inspection. 52
With the exception of the attorney-client correspondence cate-
gory, there is certainly leeway for honest disagreement among rea-
sonable persons in regard to whether the items listed should be con-
sidered public records under the terms of the statute. However, there
are also very important policy considerations which support the con-
clusion that such records are not public under the statute. Therefore,
these examples merit, and will receive, further discussion.
11 See generally Rowley v. Ferguson, 37 Ohio L. Abs. 531, 48 N.E.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1942):
Offlo REv. CoDE ANN. § 2317.02(A) (Page Supp. 1975).
52 See 71 OHIo ATr'Y GEN. Op., No. 053 (1971).
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1. Inter-office and Intra-office Memoranda
It is clear that inter-office and intra-office memoranda are not
required by statute to be produced or maintained; 3 on the other
hand, it is a fact of governmental life that they are widely used by
public officials. Some might take the position that because such
memoranda are so widely utilized they are necessary to the function-
ing of the agency and are therefore subject to public inspection pur-
suant to the "required to be kept" rationale of Dayton Newspapers.
But there remains a basic qualitative difference between most such
memoranda and the jail log at issue in Dayton Newspapers. It was
necessary to maintain the jail log over a period of time in order to
properly operate the city jail. One cannot fairly make this statement
about all inter-office and intra-office memoranda.
It is necessary to recognize that there are different types of
memoranda: those which reflect official positions on a particular
matter, and those which lack this status or are merely tentative or
exploratory in nature. The former type is necessarily required to be
maintained so that they can be consistently followed, and is therefore
required to be kept under the reasoning of the court in Dayton
Newspapers. Memoranda of the latter type, being merely explora-
tory, do not serve to document decisions and policies of the agency
and are thus not required to be kept.
As mentioned above, there is also a very important policy reason
for concluding that the latter unofficial type of memoranda should
not be considered a public record. The public interest would be best
served by encouraging free and frank interchange among public offi-
cials. If all such exchanges were subject to public scrutiny, there
would be a chilling effect which could affect the nature of such ex-
changes, and presumably, this would have a deleterious effect on the
quality of governmental services. Thus there are both legal and policy
reasons supporting the proposition that not all inter-office and intra-
office memoranda should be subject to public inspection.
2. Complaint Letters
The above application of the holding in Dayton Newspapers to
inter- and intra-office memoranda is equally applicable to complaint
letters and their authors' identities. They are not specifically required
by statute to be kept 4 and the governmental unit involved could
" "[llnter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available
by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency" are exempted from
disclosure under the Federal Freedom of Information Act. 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(5) (1970).
", This particular exemption from disclosure is also recognized by the Federal Freedom
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properly fulfill its statutory obligations without maintaining com-
plaint letters or the identity of their authors. However, licensing agen-
cies such as the State Dental Board, State Medical Board and the
Ohio Department of Health receive a considerable number of such
letters, and there are those who would argue that they should be
subject to public inspection. Nonetheless, however useful such letters
may be to the recipient state agency, they are clearly dissimilar to the
jail log in Dayton Newspapers and should not be considered public
records.
In addition to the fact that the recipient agency can properly
function without the preservation of these items, there are compelling
policy reasons for maintaining a degree of confidentiality in this
situation. Complaint letters may contain false and scandalous infor-
mation which should not be publicized, as well as very serious allega-
tions which need to be further investigated under cover of secrecy.
Furthermore, the author of such a letter may wish to bring the infor-
mation to the attention of the proper authorities without risking
detection by the subject of the complaint, which could place the
complainant or another person in danger. A good example of this is
the registration of a complaint by a relative or friend of a nursing
home patient who is purportedly being abused by the nursing home
management. Another example is the employee who wishes to regis-
ter a labor related complaint against his employer." Perhaps the most
compelling example is the person who anonymously informs the po-
lice of a criminal violation. In any of these situations, the mere possi-
bility of retaliatory action should be enough to deter one from argu-
ing that such information should be considered public. The absence
of a shield from public disclosure of complaint letters would undoubt-
edly cause a severe chilling effect upon the supply of such informa-
tion, which would not be in the best interests of criminal or civil law
enforcement."
3. Investigative Work Product
The last area requiring further scrutiny is that which has been
loosely described as "investigative work product." It should be imme-
of Information Act. Id. § 552(b)(7), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
11 The federal courts have recognized the need for confidentiality in employee-employer
situations. See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1964); Wirtz v. B.A.C.
Steel Products, Inc., 312 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1962); Clement Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 282 F. Supp.
540 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
5 It could also be argued that complaint letters are not public under the reasoning of
Curran v. Board of Park Commrs in that such "records" originate outside of the governmental
unit involved. However, this distinction is unsound. See text accompanying notes 34 and 35
supra.
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diately noted that this is the most difficult area of analysis since these
materials more clearly resemble the character of the jail log at issue
in Dayton Newspapers.
If an agency is directed by statute to conduct investigations and
maintain records of these activities, the immediate problem is what
kind of records are required to be kept. Presumably, the investiga-
tor's file would include raw notes, final investigation reports, various
statistical data pertaining to all investigations, complaint letters, ma-
terials relating to investigative techniques, proposed strategy of fu-
ture activity, and witness statements. As a matter of policy there is a
very serious question whether any of this material ought to be subject
to public inspection. The potential for unnecessary harm to the char-
acter or business of the target of the investigation, to the ultimate
success of the investigation, and to proper investigation and law en-
forcement seems inevitable if such files are subject to unlimited public
inspection.
On the other hand, the nature of such materials is closely akin
to the jail log in Dayton Newspapers. It would seem that the constitu-
tional ramifications discussed in Dayton Newspapers with regard to
the jail log do not attach to the contents of an investigatory file.
However, the logical considerations that apply in the "required to be
kept" analysis regarding investigatory files are rather similar to those
regarding the jail log. A major ongoing investigation of almost any
type could not be conducted without maintaining some sort of notes
or records of the investigation for later use, though the extent and
content of such records would vary widely. Thus it can be reasonably
argued that investigatory files fall within the purview of the court's
analysis of the phrase "required to be kept" in Dayton Newspapers.
At this point one begins to perceive a rather pure dilemma. Does
the right to inspect public records outweigh the social need for a
limited degree of unfettered civil and criminal law enforcement? Pri-
marily because of the strength of the opposing policy considerations
this author would conclude that, with the exception of finalized for-
mal reports and the various statistical data previously described,
these materials should not be subject to public inspection.
There is limited precedent which would support this position. In
1971, the Attorney General, in responding to a request from the
Superintendent of the State Highway Patrol, rendered the following
opinion:
I think it is clear. . . that the 1963 Act (Section 149.43, supra) was
not intended to make everything in the files of any department of
the State a 'public record' and that the raw case file of a Highway
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Patrol investigation is not included within the meaning of that
term."
The Attorney General also noted that the Federal Freedom of Infor-
mation Act provides a specific exemption for "investigatory files
compiled for law enforcement purposes.""8
Thus, although the Ohio courts have not been required to rule
on this specific issue, it would be wise for both the public officials
involved and any court which might struggle with this issue to adopt
the position taken by the Attorney General.
V. THE COMPETING RIGHT TO PRIVACY
As noted earlier, the Ohio Supreme Court's slight reference in
State ex rel. Grosser v. Boy 9 to an envisioned "competing right to
individual privacy" has become a reality with the passage of
Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 99.6O This legislation, which will
become effective on January 1, 1977, is designed to protect the rights
of individuals who are the subject of information stored in govern-
ment-maintained computer banks. The stated purpose of the Act is
to regulate the use of personal information by state and local gov-
ernments, to create the Ohio Personal Information Control Board,
to require government computer systems to give public notice of
their existence, and to protect the privacy of individuals from exces-
sive record keeping by government.
The "personal information" subject.to the provisions of the Act
is defined as
any information that describes anything about a person, or indicates
actions done by or to a person, or indicates that a person possesses
certain personal characteristics, and that contains a name, identify-
ing number, symbol, or other identifier assigned to a person."
The rights of a person who is the subject of a personal informa-
tion system, as well as the allowable uses of such information, are
fairly well established by the statute, although further refinement will
17 71 OHIo ATT'y GEN. Op., No. 053, at 2-183 (1971).
'1 Id. at 182, citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(1970). This exemption was clarified in the 1974
amendments to that section. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. IV, 1974).
11 42 Ohio St. 2d 498, 500 n.2, 330 N.E.2d 442, 444 n.2 (1975). See also note 39 supra
and accompanying test.
0 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1347.01-.99 (Page Current Service 1976). This legislation is
very similar to, but not as comprehensive as, the Federal Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(Supp. IV, 1974).
"t OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1347.01(D) (Page Current Service 1976).
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certainly occur upon the adoption of the various rules which are
required to follow.
The first new right of an individual who is the subject of a
personal information system is his right to be aware of this fact. With
the exception of those agencies whose "principle function" relates to
the enforcement of criminal laws,62 every state or local agency that
maintains a personal information system is required, upon the re-
quest and proper identification of the inquiring person, to inform him
of the existence of any personal information in the system of which
he is the subject.13 The agency must also allow the individual or his
attorney, or both, to inspect all personal information in the system
which pertains to him.64 At this time the agency is also required to
inform the requesting person of the uses made of any such personal
information as well as the identity of any users of the information
who are usually granted access to the system."
This legislation also requires that every agency that maintains a
personal information system must maintain that information with
such a degree of accuracy, relevance, timeliness and completeness "as
is necessary to assure fairness in any determination made with respect
to the person on the basis of the information"" and to collect only
such personal information as is necessary and relevant to the func-
tions that the agency is required to perform by statute, ordinance,
code, or rule.67 The second major right created by this legislation
concerns the right of a person to dispute the accuracy, relevance,
timeliness, or completeness of any personal information pertaining to
him that is maintained by an agency." The agency is required to
delete any information that it cannot verify or that it finds to be
inaccurate.69 If after this determination is made the citizen remains
dissatisfied, he has the right to submit "a brief statement of his
position on the disputed information" which the agency must include
or refer to in any subsequent transfer, report, or dissemination of the
disputed information."
This legislation also restricts the permissible uses of personal
- Id. § 1347.04(A).
Id. § 1347.08(A)(1).
" Id. § 1347.08(A)(2). See also § 1347.08(C), (E), which place certain limitations on this
right.
- Id. § 1347.08(A)(3).
66 Id. § 1347.05(F), (H).
Id. § 1347.05(l).
" Id. § 1347.09(A)(1).
' Id.
7. Id. § 1347.09(A)(2).
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information. Section 1347.07 of the Revised Code mandates that
unless certain rather stringent criteria are met:
No state or local agency shall disclose any personal information to
another state or local agency, to a federal agency, or to any person
or use the information to determine individual benefits, eligibility,
privileges, or rights, without the prior consent of the person who is
the subject of the information .... 71
There are four specific criteria which must be complied with
before gaining access to a person's personal information maintained
by an agency. These four criteria, which are cumulative in nature, are
as follows:
1. The disclosure or use of the personal information is consistent
with the stated purposes of the system and the stated types of uses
of the information as described in the notice filed with the Depart-
ment of Administrative Services or the Ohio Personal Information
Control Board pursuant to Section 1347.03 of the Revised Code;
2. The disclosure or use of the personal information is authorized
by rules adopted by the Department of Administrative Services or
the Ohio Personal Information Control Board pursuant to Section
1347.06 of the Revised Code or is otherwise required or authorized
by federal law or state statutes;
3. The disclosure or use of the personal information is a routine
use of information contained in an agency personnel file;
4. The disclosure is made pursuant to a written request, identify-
ing the person making the request, and the information disclosed
indicates whether a person named in the request is employed by the
agency or licensed by the agency, or both.72
Clearly, the purpose of the Act is to limit access to the large
amount of personal information contained in governmental files and
computers. However, there is an immediate question presented: how
to construe Revised Code §§ 149.43 and 1347.07 in relation to each
other. This is especially a problem in light of the provision in
§ 1347.07(A)(2) allowing the disclosure of information that is "other-
wise required or authorized by federal law or state statutes." There
will be those who will argue that because of the inclusion of this
provision, anything that was previously subject to inspection pursuant
to § 149.43 should remain subject to inspection. However, acceptance
of this argument would destroy the fundamental purpose of this later
enacted legislation-to create a viable right of privacy in regard to
personal information contained in governmental files and computers.
71 Id. § 1347.07(A).
72 Id. § 1347.07(A)(i)-(4).
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The express limitations of access to personal information that are the
heart of the privacy statute would be completely ineffectual if this
information could be obtained by anyone under the public records
statute. Thus it is submitted that passage of the Privacy Bill has
carved a moderate, yet very important, exception out of the general
right to inspect public records.
VI. ENFORCEMENT OF THE RIGHT TO INSPECT PUBLIC RECORDS
The nature of any legal right is to some degree determined by
the remedies available for enforcement of that right. Under § 149.43,
all public officials have a mandatory legal duty to make all public
records available for inspection, subject only to the reasonableness of
the request and provision for the safety of the record being in-
spected.73 Section 149.43 also provides that upon request, copies of
such records are to be made available within a reasonable period of
time.
Because performance of this duty is specifically required by law,
one may bring an action in mandamus to compel inspection of public
records. 7 Of course, the agency involved may legitimately dispute the
action based on either the nature of the record at issue or the duty to
allow inspection of public records under the circumstances of the
case. However, one may, upon successfully prosecuting a mandamus
action to compel disclosure of public records, bring a "taxpayer's
action" under Revised Code § 733.61 for the purpose of recovering
attorney fees.75
It is also clear that one may seek an injunction to compel disclo-
sure of public records. 7 In the past there has been some dispute as
to whether mandamus or injunction was the proper remedy;77 how-
ever, it appears that the Ohio Supreme Court has found either proce-
7 See Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 45 Ohio St. 2d 107, 109, 341 N.E.2d
576, 577 (1976).
11 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2731.01-.16 (Page 1953). For a discussion of available
remedies, see State ex rel. White v. City of Cleveland, 34 Ohio St. 2d 37, 295 N.E.2d 665 (1973).
11 State ex rel White v. City of Cleveland, 34 Ohio St. 2d 37, 295 N.E.2d 665 (1973).
Reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court in White held that the appellees, already
successful in their mandamus action brought under § 733.58 of the Revised Code, had met the
prerequisites to a taxpayer's action under § 733.59, and could in the trial court's discretion
recover attorneys' fees under § 733.61 for successfully enforcing the public rights derived from
the public records statute. But see State ex rel. Grosser v. Boy, 46 Ohio St. 2d 184, 347 N.E.2d
539 (1976), in which the court denied a recovery of attorneys' fees in a mandamus action
brought pursuant to chapter 2731 of the Revised Code, stating that this recovery is barred in
the absence of a specific statutory authorization.
"' Owo REV. CODE ANN. § 2727.01-.21 (Page 1953).
7 See Curran v. Board of Park Comm'rs, 22 Ohio Misc. 197, 259 N.E.2d 757 (C.P. Lake
Cty. 1970).
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dural vehicle acceptable. 8
Finally, § 149.99, Revised Code, provides for a forfeiture of one
hundred dollars to the state for each violation of the public records
statute. The Attorney General is empowered to collect such forfei-
tures in a civil action.79
VI. CONCLUSION
As one examines the extent and limitations of the right of the
public to inspect records maintained by public officials in Ohio, it
becomes apparent that a great deal of careful interpretation is re-
quired to apply the mandates of the public records statute to a partic-
ular situation. The Ohio Supreme Court, however, has provided a
fairly workable standard which should lead the public and its officials
to the conclusion that most, though not all, governmental records
should be made available for public inspection.
Obviously, there are very important competing values and inter-
ests which must be balanced in properly establishing the extent of the
right of the public to examine public records. Although in a democ-
racy such as ours important philosophical consideration suggest that
this right should be as broad as reasonably possible, one must not
short-change bona fide concerns that certain records contained in the
files of public officials should not be made public. A certain amount
of confidentiality is necessary to ensure that public officials are al-
lowed to function in a manner which best serves the interests of
society. The total elimination of governmental confidentiality would
create both a chilling effect on the free and frank exchange among
public officials and an undue obstacle to the proper enforcement of
civil and criminal law.
Finally, one must not ignore the fact that, as a result of the
complexities of our society certain highly personal information per-
taining to any 6itizen may eventually be placed in a government file
or computer. The general public right to inspect governmental re-
cords should not contravene any significant right of personal privacy.
Therefore, it seems certain that either the General Assembly or the
courts will ultimately be forced to further clarify the delicate balance
required among these competing interests.
78 Id.; Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 45 Ohio St. 2d 107, 341 N.E.2d 576
(1976).
" OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 149.99 (Page 1969).
